Additive Manufacturing, a.k.a. 3D Printing, is increasingly used to manufacture functional parts, including components of safety critical systems.
INTRODUCTION
Metal Additive Manufacturing (AM), a.k.a. 3D Printing, is a rapidly growing multibillion dollar industry. One recent example of AM adoption is GE's fuel nozzle for the next generation LEAP jet engine [31, 38] .
rough part consolidation, GE has used AM to create a part ve times more durable and being 25% lighter than was possible with typical subtractive manufacturing processes.
Even with its ever-increasing popularity, AM faces many challenges it must overcome before rivaling traditional subtractive manufacturing processes. One of the most crucial limitations is the lack of in-situ quality control methods [21] . Most current quality control methods are not usable in-process and involve costly and time-consuming post-processing nondestructive and selective destructive evaluation. is extends manufacturing time, leading to lower production rates and higher cost-per-part. Everton et al. provides a comprehensive list of currently viable and speculative in-situ process control methods [11] . While infrared (IR) imaging systems have yet to see widespread use in commercial additive manufacturing, the study and implementation of such systems is important to the worldwide commercial acceptance and competitiveness of metal AM.
To date, very li le if any work has been done in terms of a security analysis of this method.
is paper o ers an analysis of possible a acks associated with implementing in-situ infrared thermography as a method of quality assurance. e remainder of this paper is structured as follows. A er discussing related work on AM security in Section 2, we provide background on metal AM and IR thermography in Section 3. We present our security analysis of this system and its impact on manufactured parts quality in Section 4. For selected a acks, we provide experimental proof of the identi ed manipulations and their consequences in Section 5. We conclude this paper with a short discussion of our ndings in Section 6 and an outline of planned future work in Section 7.
RELATED WORK
Security of additive manufacturing is a fairly new research area.
reats to AM have been dichotomized into two primary threat categories: (1) Sabotage and (2) Intellectual Property (IP) violations. Sabotage a acks aim to in ict physical damage, either by compromising part quality or by harm to the actual AM equipment. IP violation a acks aim to illegally replicate 3D objects or the manufacturing process itself. For this paper, only sabotage is relevant.
A growing body of publications discusses how a manufactured part's quality can be compromised in a cyber-physical sabotage a ack.
e rst proof of concept for a sabotage-style a ack on an additive manufacturing device was presented by Xiao [40] . It was shown that the a ack can modify "printing results" such as the dimensions, positioning, and integrability of the components, among others. Sturm et al. [35] used malware pre-installed on a computer to automate manipulations of .stl les, and provided an empirical demonstration that a part's tensile strength could be degraded by introducing volumetric defects such as voids. By using a material with signi cantly di erent sti ness values, Zeltmann et al. [44] used nite element analysis to show that the introduction of these "pseudo-voids" which were beneath the detection limit of their ultrasonic quality control tools greatly reduced the strength of the printed part. An a ack that inserts voids with geometry leading to a stress concentration and reduced fatigue life was proposed and empirically demonstrated by Belikovetsky et al. [6] . A phishing a ack was used to install a backdoor that enabled the targeted insertion of rectangular voids into the design les for a drone quadcopter propeller by a remote adversary. e manipulated part was then printed and then ight tested. A er only a few minutes the manipulated part experienced a catastrophic failure at the site of the void, leading to the loss of the drone.
Yampolskiy et al. [42] argued that the anisotropy that is characteristic of additively manufactured components can be misused to degrade part quality. e e ect of misoriented printing on mechanical properties has been shown by Zeltmann et al. [44] for polymers using the FDM process, where the tensile properties were reduced by over 20 percent using a printing orientation perpendicular to that of the control. For metal-based AM, Yampolskiy et al. [42] also argued that both scanning speed and strategy as well as the amplitude of the heat source can greatly sabotage the quality of parts produced by powder bed fusion.
Yampolskiy et al. [43] proposed a framework for analyzing attacks on or with AM. According to this framework, a variety of a ack vectors can be used to compromise one or more elements of the AM work ow.
e compromised element(s), their roles in the work ow, and the degree to which an adversary can control these element(s) determine which manipulations an adversary can perform.
ese manipulations, in conjunction with the type of AM equipment, source materials, and object application area, determine the achievable e ects. Only a fraction of the achievable e ects intersect with the adversary's goals. e authors identify the intersection of a ack e ects and adversarial goals as a ack targets (or threats).
Several analyses have been performed on the possibility of compromising AM equipment. Moore et al. [24] analyzed open source so ware that is commonly used with desktop 3D printers, namely Marlin rmware and three GUI applications that communicate with the printer via G-code: Cura 3D, ReplicatorG, and Repetier-Host.
eir static analysis of the source code, along with dynamic analysis of the communication protocols between the 3D printer and the computer revealed numerous vulnerabilities that could be exploited in a malicious a ack. Do et al. [10] analyzed a wireless communication protocol employed by a desktop 3D printer. eir analysis found vulnerabilities that could be exploited to stop current and submit a new prints. Moore et al. [25] empirically demonstrated that a malicious 3D printer rmware can arbitrarily manipulate manufacturing parameters, and modify or even completely replace the printed object.
BACKGROUND
In this section, we rst outline the general Powder Bed Fusion (PBF) process and then discuss in detail how a typical IR thermography system is incorporated into the build process. Both provide information necessary to the security discussion that we present in Section 4.
Powder Bed Fusion (PBF)
While AM can be used with a broad (and ever increasing) variety of source materials, metal-based AM is being applied predominately for aerospace and medical applications. One of the most popular metal AM methods is powder bed fusion (PBF), a process in which a build plate is coated with a thin layer of metal powder which is then selectively melted. is process is repeated layer-by-layer to completion. Laser based systems use an inert gas such as argon to ll the build chamber, whereas electron beam melting (EBM) systems require a vacuum [14] .
Numerous parameters of the process can in uence the manufactured part's mechanical properties. Gibson et al. [14] states that process parameters t into one of four categories: laser-related parameters, scan-related parameters, powder-related parameters, and temperature-related parameters. Laser-related parameters include parameters such as laser power and spot size. Scan-related parameters include scan speed, hatch spacing, and scan strategy. Particle shape, size, and packing density fall under the powderrelated parameters, whereas temperature-related parameters are typically a function of powder bed temperature and laser parameters. Some PBF parameters are strongly correlated. For example, a lower powder bed temperature and powder energy absorption rate would lead to a necessary increase the beam power.
In a typical production process, these parameters maintain a xed value throughout the duration of the build; however, due to the inherent complexities associated with PBF, this static manufacturing method can be detrimental to nal part quality [36] . An example of the necessity to alter parameters during manufacture is when creating a part with complex geometries such as overhanging surfaces [37] . Process parameters must be constantly adjusted as the part is manufactured. Various research e orts have focused on these parameters, particularly what e ect each one has on nal part build quality and how to best measure the e ects of these parameters in-situ to allow for the purposeful manipulation of the process parameters to improve nal build quality [21] .
As current in-situ quality control methods cannot prevent issues like porosity, complicated post-processing procedures are applied to remedy the potential problems. In the case of PBF, hot isostatic pressing (HIP) is a post-processing method. HIP is a costly and time consuming process in which an object is placed into a high pressure, high temperature environment in order to alleviate various problems associated with this (and other) AM methods, primarily porosity [12] . However, HIP can also reduce yield strength due to the formation of undesirable microstructures [16] . e part will then go through further nondestructive evaluations to ensure that it is of acceptable quality.
ermography in AM
e primary intent of IR thermographic in situ monitoring in AM is to detect, and evaluate the formation of voids in the manufactured object, referred to as porosity. Pores are voids formed in the object in its initial creation, either from an increase in heat leading to excessive melt pool turbulence and evaporation [9] or from an insu cient energy density leading to incomplete powder melting [4] . Another problem IR thermography aims to detect is non-uniformity in build temperature. Non-uniform object temperatures can lead to thermal stress and to undesirable microstructural variations in the object. is is a highly problematic outcome that can lead to a host of problems with the nal quality of an object, such as strong anisotropic e ects and reduction of tensile strength [45, 46] . IR thermographic monitoring systems entail the use of one or multiple IR and/or near IR cameras and o en include single-point IR pyrometers (e.g.., ber-coupled). ese cameras are placed either behind a window looking directly into the build chamber, or are optically coupled into the imaging system of the build laser to obtain a coaxial view. In windowed setups, the window is made of a material suitable for high transmi ance of infrared wavelengths such as germanium, as typical silica-based glass has unsuitably low transmi ance in the wavelength range of most IR cameras (3-12 µm) [28] . In some systems, particularly EBM, a mechanical shu er system and/or protective lm is also put in place to prevent damage to the window from the harsh environment of the build chamber, predominantly metallization that can occur from the melting of metal powder particles [33] . In this setup, the shu er is closed during operation of the laser or electron beam and brie y opens a er the pass is nished to allow the IR camera to capture temperature data, particularly that of the melt pool. Camera data is processed by a so ware solution which can then, in the case of closed-loop systems, alter build parameters accordingly. is so ware solution uses computationally intensive image processing to allow for temperature stabilization and the detection of voids, the la er typically done by comparing captured image data to previously acquired example images of defective parts fabricated with PBF [23] . Accurate temperature readings are primarily dependent upon accurate calibration data [32] .
Current experimental methods require workarounds for a lack of an application programming interface (API) for the control so ware; however, as in-situ process control methods mature they will likely be integrated by manufacturers.
Calibration.
ality control and assurance relies extensively on accurate sensor data. Calibration of IR imaging systems is of the utmost importance in the acquisition of temperature measurements precise enough to be used in an autonomous system. e accuracy of a thermal imaging system is dependent on the e ect of environmental conditions (re ectivity) and surface properties (emissivity). e radiant energy emi ed by an object is determined by its temperature, spectral emissivity (the object's ability to radiate energy), radiation from the surrounding enclosure, and atmospheric transmission. Rodriguez et al. [32] have shown that the main sources of thermographic disturbance are the ambient, re ecting sources, and the target's emissivity.
Several di erent readings must be taken to accurately calibrate the readings from inside the build chamber. A transmission value for the protective window through which the thermal camera looks must be recorded. is is done by heating a blackbody calibration source and comparing temperature readings from thermocouples to those given by the camera both with and without the window in place.
Ambient surface radiation is determined from the enclosure's material properties and mean radiant temperature. is involves taking temperature readings from all surfaces in an enclosure while at operating temperature and factoring these readings into the surface type of each wall, giving an accurate model for surface radiation emi ed by the enclosure itself.
Most importantly, the emissivity of the material being used in manufacturing must be known. Commonly a blackbody cavity will be used for this purpose. Determination of the emissivity a particular material involves fabrication of a blackbody cavity from that material using the process that is being evaluated. is cavity is then thoroughly cleaned of any loose powder and heated. e blackbody design's emissivity is used as the default se ing for the thermal camera.
e absolute surface temperature given by thermocouples a ached to the radiator is then compared to the thermal camera readings. e emissivity value used by the camera is then manually modi ed until its temperature reading is the same as the thermocouples'. e resulting emissivity value is the value assigned to the (solid) material in question. A similar process is then used to determine the emissivity of the unmelted powder present in the powder bed, whereby a thermocouple is embedded into a part and used to compare temperature readings with the camera [32] .
Open-Loop Systems.
Most currently implemented IR solutions are purely open-loop; that is, they exist solely for an operator to manually verify that a part is being manufactured correctly. In an open-loop system IR cameras are typically separate from the direct manufacturing process; that is, there exists an air-gap between the manufacturing and the quality control systems. IR data captured in open-loop systems is typically examined a er the part has been manufactured as to gauge porosity in the nal part as well as to ensure that the manufacturing process operated within speci cation. e open-loop process is heavily dependent upon traditional destructive evaluation techniques to certify part quality. If a part fails inspection, the IR imagery captured during production is used to enhance postmortem analysis of the failure. e trail-and-error necessitated by the use of an open loop system can increase costs and part turnaround times as compared to a closed loop system. However, an open loop system is signi cantly easier to design and operate, as well as requiring lower upfront costs.
Closed-Loop Systems.
In a closed-loop system, the IR imaging system is expected to be integrated with the manufacturing control system to allow su ciently fast feedback using programmable logic controllers (PLCs) or eld-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs). IR camera(s) are used to measure the ongoing production process such that readings can be used to autonomously or semi-autonomously correct defects and keep process parameters within accepted operational ranges. Depending on the defect size and type, di erent actions are taken. Generated defects such as void formation can be actively monitored during a build and dealt with in-process through a combination of rescanning porous areas and increasing or decreasing energy densities proactively in order to prevent further void formation. Porosity can also be used as a measure to halt production or to ag a part for more rigorous post processing and quali cation [22] .
SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we discuss how malicious manipulations on the IR thermography can be introduced via di erent a ack vectors, and how each a ack can a ect nal build quality.
Adversary Model
Section 2 outlines several AM-related a acks discussed in the research literature.
e majority of these a acks contain classical cyber-security components. ese include installation of malware [35] or a backdoor [6] on a controller PC, substitution of 3D printer rmware with a malicious version [25] , or exploitation of weaknesses in wireless communication protocols [10] . All these enable adversaries to tamper with digital blueprints in their various representations, e.g., STL les. While being very potent, these avenues of a ack are obvious to cyber-security experts. Classical cyber-security means can be employed to e ectively combat such a acks, e.g., by digitally signing a cryptographic hash value of a
le. An increased awareness of potential cyber-security issues is motivating a push to employ various cyber-security means in the AM environment [3] .
Industrial-grade AM machines consist of numerous diverse subsystems. When these are compromised, a acks which are not limited to the controller PC, rmware, and networks can be staged. e situation becomes even more complicated for additive manufacturing because of its inherently cyber-physical nature. Sabotage a acks might not only change a part's 3D geometry, but also its microstructural properties [42] . Furthermore, such a acks can be performed not only directly, but also by more exotic means such as disturbing communication timing or impairing power supply [27, 41] .
Cardenas et al. [7] identi ed tampering with sensor information a way to in uence the behavior of a cyber-physical system (CPS) employing control loops. We apply this concept to a metal AM machine, focusing on in-situ IR thermography. In this paper, we assume that an adversary can manipulate any aspect of IR thermography, and focus solely on manipulations and their impacts on manufactured part quality. Speci cally, we investigate whether and to what extent IR thermography alone can be used to perform sabotage a acks.
For this paper, we consider the motivation of an adversary to perform an a ack via IR thermography to be out of scope. As an exemplary reason, this approach might minimize the probability of an a ack being detected.
Similarly, we consider a ack vectors which compromise components of IR thermography out of scope. Just to give an example, a supply chain a ack can be used to compromise an IR camera's rmware or hardware. Introduced hardware Trojans can employ complex triggers that will prevent their detection during functional testing [29] ; detecting Trojans via side-channel analysis might be limited by the Trojan's relative size [2] .
Attack Methods

Calibration Data.
Even when properly calibrated, obtaining true temperature readings from IR cameras is nearly impossible [26] . us, the alteration of any of the various data points which constitute this calibration data could in uence the manufacturing process and thus have a dire impact on part quality. As stated in Section 3.2.1, these data points can include the transmission value of the window, emissivity of an object, emissivity of unmelted powder, re ection from the build chamber, and the camera's own internal diagnostic calibrations. e alteration of any one of these would introduce signi cant inaccuracies to the system's estimation of the melt pool and/or absolute skin temperature of the object.
In a closed-loop system, an a ack that manipulates calibration data has the capability of directly impacting manufactured part quality. If the object is shown to be cooler than that of the actual temperature, the system will a empt compensation in the form is can lead to melt pool turbulence and evaporation of material, which in turn leads to both an increase in porosity and a negative change in grain structure growth, given a high enough temperature di erential [19, 34] .
Decreased Part Performance
Conversely, if the system is deceived into estimating that the object or melt pool is ho er that what is accurate, energy densities would be lowered dramatically. Depending on the temperature di erence between the actual melt pool and the modi ed readings, the system would drastically lower energy densities. e direct consequences would include a signi cant amount of unmelted powder particles present in the part and a large increase of porosity. In addition, a large temperature di erential between layers can lead to a large increase in porosity due to lack of fusion between layers.
is is primarily due to the creation of a much shallower, less stable melt pool which does not adequately remelt lower layers to allow for proper fusion between layers [1] . Figure 2 shows a causal chain in the event of an a ack.
While open-loop calibration data can be altered essentially the same way as closed-loop data, the consequences of such an a ack do not directly a ect the quality of the built part. Instead, an a acker has the capability of disrupting post-production quality control. In this case, compromised thermal imaging data could obscure generated part defects, possibly leading to a substandard part passing quality control. On the other end of the spectrum, an a acker also has the capability of disqualifying parts that are within speci cation, leading to either unnecessary post processing or total rejection of the part.
It is important to note that, in both open-and closed-loop systems, manipulations of calibration process will have a direct and identical e ect on every layer of manufactured parts. erefore, such a acks can be comparatively easily detected even via NDT testing of selected parts, including microscopy and subsequent morphology of last layer. A malware that periodically manipulates calibration data should be able to evade detection for a longer period of time, because only a fraction of parts will be manufacturing using corrupted calibration data.
Thermal Camera.
Another element that can be compromised by an a ack is the thermal camera itself. is a ack a ects both open-loop and closed-loop systems in similar ways, yet with a couple of key di erences. Aside from the obvious physical tampering of the camera, an inconspicuous and damaging a ack would be to force the camera to remain on constantly. IR cameras are capable of logging immense amounts of data, and leaving one on all the time could ll the hard drive or saturate a network connection, forcing the system o ine or creating errors in the analysis of data [26] . Another consequence of this action is the dramatic increase in processor and memory usage as all the image data is cataloged and analyzed.
In the case of a closed-loop system where processing power, primary, and possibly even secondary memory may be shared between the quality assurance and manufacturing systems, this could be very disruptive to the build process in ways that equipment manufacturers may have li le to no safeguard for. Even if the processing subsystems are separate, a closed-loop system will be forced to enter some sort of "fail-safe" mode if the quality control system were to be brought o ine. is would lead to a part that has very li le guarantee of being defect-free and would have to be further examined before acceptance.
Reference Data.
As part defects are detected by comparing captured image data to preexisting reference data, any alteration to the computational parameters used by the algorithm, or the images themselves could be an avenue of a ack for a potential adversary. If an a acker increased the allowed computed tolerances or disabled the computation altogether between the two data sets, especially in association with a acks on other parts of the system, part defect generation could far exceed operational limits. Alternatively, a secondary a ack could be performed in which the alteration of the reference process is not a direct a ack on part quality but rather is used to e ectively disable the system's ability to detect the e ects of a acks from other a ack vectors. Such a surreptitious strategy could allow an a ack to subsist much longer than another, more obvious a ack. e e ects of compromised reference data are principally identical in closed-loop and open-loop systems.
Shu er Mechanism.
Another novel a ack vector is an a ack on the shu er mechanism. In electron beam based production systems, forcing the shu er to remain open for longer than it should, or even permanently, would cause the glass to become appreciably metalized; this would lead to a drastic decrease in the window's ability to pass IR radiation through to the camera it protects. is decrease in transmi ance would e ectively cripple the camera by reducing the blackbody radiation reaching the sensor and therefore the computed temperature values. is would lead to the false conclusion that increased energy densities would be necessary to maintain optimal operational temperatures. Another prospective a ack is to force the shu er to activate much on a different period as compared to the exact frequency needed to capture the images at the given framerate, interrupting image capture when the time periods overlap. is would induce an e ect in which the amount of time the sensor is exposed for each picture and, as a result, temperature estimates would uctuate wildly as a function of time.
Control
Loop. e previously described a acks are indiscriminate and, therefore, can be easily detected. A acks on the control loop itself, on the contrary, can be both targeted and potentially stealthy. Cardenas et al. [7] identify that in a control loop governed cyber-physical system, both controller and its associated communication channels (from sensors to controller, and from controller to actuators) can be compromised; additionally, communication channels can be interrupted. Pope et al. [27] further argue that the disruption of communication timing (even without altering commands and sensor information) might result in disruption of AM process.
If any of these manipulations can be introduced arbitrarily into a control loop, an adversary can achieve a selective impact on a sub-set of part's layer. is might drastically reduce detectability of an a ack using NDT. False IR sensor information will lead to overreactions described above and summarized in Figure 2 . e effects of communication interruption might vary between di erent equipment; it can include a fail-safe stop of manufacturing process, or continuation of the process based on the latest received data. Disruption of communication timing will lead to skipped adjustments for few layers and then to overreaction for several subsequent layers. e a ected layers may show e ects like increased porosity and others described above (summarized in Table 1 ).
Even more powerful is an ampli cation of feedback, in turn forcing an overreaction from the control system. is has the possibility of forcing a runaway reaction where the system oscillates wildly, leading to any number of undesirable behaviors. is could include the e ects of any of the aforementioned a acks.
Alteration of environmental variables within the build chamber would have a devastating e ect on both part viability and manufacturing equipment. In electron beam-based systems, where manufacture takes place in a vacuum, and laser-based systems, where the build chamber is lled with an inert gas during production, increasing the amount of ambient air present in the build chamber can lead to oxidation in the part and lower energy beam e ciencies [30] . Another consequence of higher-than-optimal ambient air ratios is the possibility of a re or explosion when combustible materials around or above their ashpoint mix with oxygen from the ambient air.
An a acker could also use a denial-of-service a ack to a empt to disrupt the controller (or controlling computer), thus halting production and requiring a re-establishment of the melt pool or proper operating conditions within the build chamber.
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section we present experimental evaluation of cyber a acks on a laser driven temperature control loop. Current commercial machines do not incorporate pyrometer or thermal camera based feedback to stabilize the melt pool temperatures in powder bed AM machines, so an experimental control loop was setup in a research AM machine. Here we present evidence recorded using our experimental control loop that cyber a acks can modify the quality of laser welds when the laser power is controlled by a feed back loop.
Experimental Environment
e AM machine used for powder bed fusion research (see Figure 3) is split into two basic parts: the optical arm and the chamber for powder spreading. e optical arm consists of a 400 W, 1070 nm wavelength laser, synchronized to a 3-axis galvanometer scanning system. e chamber consists of a piston with an a ached substrate plate, that powder is spread over. In this experiment no powder was used and the substrate plate, made of 316L stainless steel was directly exposed to the laser. e laser forms a liquid melt pool of 200 µm diameter, larger than the 100 µm beam diameter. e temperature of the melt pool is above 1700 C and incandesces in the near IR. Traveling backwards through the scanner opposite the laser light the incandescence is directed onto a pyrometer through a dichroic mirror (see Figure 4 ). e pyrometer signal varies monotonically with the temperature of the melt pool. It is aligned to Figure 4 : Layout of used IR thermography system average the signal originating from an area that covers the entire meltpool.
Closed loop control was implemented by spli ing the analog signal that normally adjusts the laser power synchronously with mirror positions. e signal from the scanner mirror controller was treated as the temperature setpoint, by multiplying by a factor of 10. Hence a commanded 200 W laser weld was interpreted as a 2000 C laser weld. Open loop recordings of the pyrometer signal were captured at laser powers between 50 and 350 W. e signal was observed to vary linearly with a slope of 0.00275 V/W in the range of 50 to 200 W. Above 200 W the slope changes due to the onset of boiling. An approximate calibration was created assuming the change to boiling at 200 W occurred at 3000 C. e linear calibration constant was nominally 5500 C/V, but was changed to 7000 C/V to simulate an a ack that exploits changing a temperature calibration. LabVIEW was used to program a digital acquisition device, to read in the setpoint and melt pool temperature, and to implement a PI feed back loop that outputs another analog signal to adjust the power of the laser. is last signal closes the gap formed by spli ing the original signal from the scanner mirror controller that controls the laser power. Tuning of the proportional and integral constants was achieved, by creating weld tracks on the substrate plate while recording the system response to a change in the melt pool setpoint.
e rst constant was 1.5e-4 and the second 3e-6. e time step used for integration was based on the chosen control loop rate.
Besides the calibration a ack, two other a acks were tested. e control loop was operated nominally at 20 kHz, but reduced to 1 kHz in order to simulate a denial-of-service a ack, or other resource consuming a ack that slows the control loops response time.
e nal a ack tested adds signal to the pyrometer signal before entering the feed back loop. is simulates a NIR light source being placed in the optical train, or any other form of electromagnetic based a ack on the pyrometer signal.
e false signal function, implemented in LabVIEW, randomly picks a new temperature o set in the range -500 C to 500 C and adds it to the scaled pyrometer signal for 200 loop cylces or 10 ms. 
Experimental Evaluation
e response of the control system for each laser weld is evaluated by plo ing the meltpool temperature which is the process variable and the laser power which is the control loop out put as a function of time. If the feedback loop is correctly tuned the meltpool temperature will follow the setpoint, while the laser power varies to compensate for changing response of the interaction between the laser and the meltpool. Figure 5 shows a plot of the control loop signals for 15 mm long, weld tracks created on a stainless steel substrate plate. Each track was scanned at a speed of 150 mm/s and required 0.1 s to complete. e control loop was held at a melt-pool setpoint of 2000 C. It's clear that all of the pyrometer measurements centered around the setpoint indicating the control loop was closed and reasonably tuned, with the laser power varying to compensate for unexpected changes in temperature or due to a simulated cyber a ack.
Comparing the control and calibration a ack traces, it appears both are stable. e only di erence is the output power dropped from an average of 150 W during the control trace to 125 W during the calibration a ack. is makes a calibration a ack particularly hard to detect by reviewing the control loop response while it's running. Of course part quality would be signi gantly e ected due to the lower scanning power, which may result in lack of fusion defects, or at low levels will result in layer delamination and eventual print loss. Since the calibration le is generally read only at system start up, the quality of the print can not be varied in time, to prevent detection. e control loop speed must be faster than the physical response of the system, which is the amount of time it takes for the meltpool temperature to increase or decrease a er a change in laser power.
is can be estimated by calculating the time it take the beam to travel one beam width, a er which it's heating a new spot on the substrate and given a di erent power will result in a di erent melt-pool temperature. For 150 mm/s and 100 µm beam size the response is 666 µs. Running the control loop at 20 kHz is fast enough to adequately control the melt pool temperature for most conditions expected in a typical machine, but 1 kHz is not. Looking again at the control loop plot, it's clear the reduction in loop rate drove the control loop into deep oscillation. is is the most dramatic of the four a acks tested, and would be the easiest to detect. e response of the control loop to false sensor data is the same as it's response to real sensor data. At 0.04 s, a large positive o set in the pyrometer signal for the false data trace is observed. At this point, the false sensor data function added 500 C to the measured temperature. e response of the control loop is to reduce the laser output power to compensate which can be seen in the laser power trace. is has a similar e ect to the calibration a ack, but can vary in time making it more di cult to detect, as it may be assumed to be a real correction to unexpected changes in the melt pool temperature.
A height map and optical image of the weld tracks is shown in Figure 6 . Track B which was created with the increased calibration constant has a reduced height compared to track A with the lower calibration constant. is also indicates a shallower melt pool depth which could lead to lack of fusion during powder welding. e loop rate a ack, track C, shows the strong laser power modulation both in width and height. e tracks were scanned le to right in the image and the point where the height changes in track D (about 1/3 of the total distance), corresponds to the time 0.04 when the large positive false data a ack occurred.
DISCUSSION
As PBF relies on a number of interrelated process parameters, any change to any particular parameter can in uence nal part quality and performance. Kamath et al. [18] have found that the most important process parameters are laser speed and power. us, any a ack that either directly or indirectly alters one or both parameters is exceptionally dangerous.
Perhaps the easiest defect to impart on an object through an a ack on the production process is an increase in porosity. Galarraga, et al., concludes that porosity has a negative e ect on tensile properties such as ultimate tensile strength, yield strength, and elongation [13] . Also noted is the presence of unmelted powder particles as crack nucleation sites, reducing mechanical properties and having a signi cant impact on cyclic load performance [20, 39] . In scenarios in which a part will be subjected to high cyclic loads, porosity will lead to a dramatically reduced lifespan, if not a total failure of the part.
An a acker wishing for a more surreptitious a ack will force low energy density levels in order to create lack of fusion defects, leading to pores lled with unmelted or partially melted powder particles. ese defects are much harder to diagnose using nondestructive evaluation techniques such as the widely-used Archimedes method suggested by ASTM [15, 17] . As a result, the best way to be truly sure a part is within speci cations is by using destructive testing methods such as microscopy and strength testing. E ects on part strength are equivalent to those from voids.
e defensive options against the presented sabotage a acks via IR thermography are worrisome. Current cyber-security solutions are not built to analyze the IR camera's rmware (or its behavior); it is further unlikely that existing antivirus so ware will be able to distinguish between malicious and non-malicious rmware updates for the camera. Acoustic side-channel-based approaches proposed by Chhetri et al. [8] and Belikovetsky et al. [5] , while showing very good results on FDM technology, cannot be applied to detect the presented a acks due to signi cant di erences with PBF. Among the main factors, the proposed a acks will not impact the behavior of any mechanical parts, thus avoiding di erences in generated sound.
CONCLUSION
e use of additive manufacturing has grown dramatically both in consumer and industrial sectors in recent years. Barriers to its widespread adoption still exist, primarily due to a lack of insitu quality control methods and intellectual property protection. However, signi cant progress continues to be made towards the ultimate goal of an additive manufacturing sector competitive with traditional subtractive manufacturing. With the increasing use of additive processes comes the corresponding increase of a ention by malicious actors to subvert these processes. To date, the necessary installation of closed-loop control systems to the additive manufacturing process has not been studied as an a ack surface by these adversarial actors. We have found that the addition of in-situ quality assurance systems built upon infrared thermography present a number of novel a ack vectors. Such an a ack has the potential to be devastating, as processing parameters in PBF are so interrelated that the ability to indirectly manipulate just one process parameter has the capability to invalidate an entire production cycle.
In the future, we plan to quantify the exact correlations between various IR thermography parameters, their impact on the process parameters, and nal part quality. Conversely, research must take place on how to best defend against such indirect a acks.
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